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Abstract
This paper makes use of a database of Spanish manufacturing firms to explore the effect of a firm’s ownership structure
on its inventory policy. We have argued that the presence of institutional investors reduces a firm’s liquidity needs andnts overinvestment policies. This, in turn, leads to lower equilibrium inventory levels. Also, we expect, on average,
ventory investment when bank-equity financing is compared with bank-debt financing. Finally, other components ofownership structure like the number of blockholders prevent inventory overinvestment. This may have an impact on the
economic cycle as more firms are floated on the stock market hence changing their ownership structure.
r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In a modern corporation, inventory investment is
well integrated into a firm’s overall investment
policy. Although the connection between financing
number of firms are floated on the stock market
thereby changing their ownership structure. This, in
turn, may affect inventory investment and, in the
end, the overall economic cycle.
We identify two channels through which owner-and investment decisions is at the very center of ship structure can affect a firm’s inventory policy:
rate finance literature, relatively little atten-
has been paid to study its relationship with a
the liquidity channel and the control channel.
The type of blockholder (banks, corporations,
erved.firm’s inventory policy. The main approach relates
liquidity constraints to inventory policy (Kashyap
et al., 1994; Hendel, 1996; Carpenter et al., 1998).
The basic result is that those financing instruments
or environments that constrain firms the most have
greater impact on inventory investment. However,
the connection between a firm’s ownership structure
and inventory policy has been totally ignored in this
literature. This paper is aimed to fill this gap. We
think this is a relevant issue because an increasing
0925-5273/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights res
doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2006.12.011
Tel.:+34916249321; fax: +34916249607.
E-mail address: joatribo@emp.uc3m.es.etc.) affects a firm’s liquidity constraints. Lenders
may be more willing to renew their loans to a firm
owned by powerful institutional shareholders. Thus,
for a firm, especially a small one with low
bargaining power, having institutional investors as
blockholders would clearly diminish its liquidity
needs. This, in turn, should induce, on average, a
lower inventory level as its need to accumulate
relatively easy cashable assets like inventories to
hedge liquidity shocks is reduced.
The second channel through which blockholders
may affect the equilibrium inventory level is the
control channel. Blockholders, contingent on their
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Econnumber and characteristics, may implement certain
types of actions against the remaining shareholders’
interests. These actions generally involve overinvest-
ment to the advantage of main blockholders that,
eventually, may affect the steady-state inventory
levels. Under this view, inventory overinvestment is
an outcome of a firm’s mismanagement (Krautter,
1999). Interestingly, recent literature (Bennedsen
and Wolfenzon, 2000) has examined these issues.
The basic result is that minority shareholders’
interests are better protected when the number of
blockholders is high. This is so because the higher
their number, the more likely they are to have
conflicting views to seek private benefits; and the
lesser likelihood of agreement on particular
investment policies. This prevents overinvestment
actions like those that lead to intensive inventory
accumulation.
Also, the control channel justifies lower inventory
investment when a firm is financed with banks’
equity instead of bank debt. This is so because the
control possibilities available to a bank as a
shareholder are superior to those as a lender.
Finally, we expect the connection between own-
ership and the equilibrium inventory level to be
especially relevant in a complex corporation. This
type of firm requires that operations managers
determine inventory level in an integrated way
taking into account manufacturing, distribution,
engineering, technology deployment, marketing and
customer services. This is to coordinate a knowledge
supply network (Mak and Ramaprasad, 2003).
These additional tasks make control more difficult,
especially within complex and diversified firms, and
give operations managers wide scope to behave
opportunistically. They can implement empire-
building policies that generally lead to inventory
overinvestment. Consequently, in this type of firm
the controlling role of blockholders like banks,
which monitor managers efficiently, should be
especially visible through the reduction in a firm’s
steady-state inventory level.
We test these theoretical contentions making use
of a yearly panel data sample of Spanish manufac-
turing firms for the period 1996–2000. Using such a
low frequency does not pose a problem; this is
because we expect that ownership structure has an
impact on the long-term value of a firm’s economic
variables and, in particular, on the long-term
inventory level. This latter steady-state level may
be proxied perfectly by the yearly average inventory
level. We find that the results fully confirm our
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J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Production214heory. First, the presence of institutional investors
ike banks or other corporations reduces the average
nventory level in small firms and/or in firms with
ertain degree of diversification. Second, the num-
er of blockholders shows a negative relationship
ith a firm’s inventory level. Last, a firm that has
anks in its ownership structure shows a lower
nventory level than a firm with a significant
roportion of bank loans but without such a bank
resence in its ownership structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
ollows. Section 2 develops the theoretical under-
innings as well as the hypotheses to be tested. In
ection 3, the empirical analysis is carried out. The
aper ends with some final remarks.
. Hypotheses to contrast
We build up our hypotheses relying on two
eatures. First, a firm’s financial structure may
enerate liquidity pressure that a firm anticipates
y investing in relatively liquid assets like inven-
ories. This pressure is conditioned by a firm’s
wnership structure (liquidity channel). Second, the
ype and number of blockholders characterizing a
rm’s ownership structure prevents overinvestment
olicies by determining the degree of control over
anagers. This, in turn, affects inventory accumu-
ation (control channel).
.1. Liquidity channel
Liquidity pressure may generate stock-outs if a
rm does not invest sufficiently in inventories
Pirttila¨ and Virolainen, 1992). Four factors that
wnership structure mediates affect this pressure:
First, the structure of product market. A firm
ith market power is less prone to accumulate
nventories in order to avoid stock-outs (Blazenko
nd Vandezande, 2003). This is so because this firm
an modulate demand by changing prices appro-
riately. In this way, it can afford accumulating
ower inventories as a reaction to liquidity pressure.
nterestingly, the presence of institutional investors
enerally increases a firm’s market power. This
meliorates the impact of liquidity necessities on
nventory investment.
Second, the length of financing. Short-term
eans higher liquidity pressure. Having bloc-
holder banks reduces liquidity pressure as it
acilitates a firm with low bargaining power (e.g. a
mall one) the renegotiation of its debt. This allows
PRESS
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n Ecoa firm to maintain a low level in short-term liquid
assets (e.g. inventories).
Third, the access to different financing instru-
ments. The lower the number of financing alter-
natives, the higher the financing pressure. A firm
with limited access to financing instruments is more
willing of using inventories to hedge liquidity shocks
(Calomiris et al, 1995, focusing on commercial
paper). Inventories are used as ‘‘buffer’’ liquid
assets. The presence of institutional investors,
especially banks, may facilitate a firm, especially a
small one,1 to issue financing instruments like
commercial paper (Diamond, 1991). This, in turn,
will make a small firm less dependent on inventories
to buffer its liquidity necessities. In the end, a lower
equilibrium inventory level is expected.
Finally, we should mention that the managers’
perceptions of liquidity needs are contingent upon
ownership structure. In particular, Wahal and
McConell (2000) among others, find that institu-
tional investors (i.e. banks or other corporations)
promote long-term managerial vision. This
smoothes out managerial reaction to local liquidity
shocks which, in turn, reduces a firm’s inventory
level as Alfaro and Tribo´ (2003) shows.
In conclusion, liquidity issues suggest that the
presence of institutional investors should prevent a
firm, especially a small one, from accumulating
large inventories.
ARTICLE
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Our basic conjecture is that an excessive accumu-
lation of inventory is a signal of mismanage-
ment (Krautter, 1999). This means that those
ownership structures that prevent collusion among
blockholders and/or managers to mismanage a
firm should be accompanied by lower inventory
levels. Ferris et al (1998) connect a firm’s adoption
of efficiency-increasing performance plans to in-
ventory shirking. Institutional investors, like
banks, promote the adoption of explicit perfor-
mance plans as part of their monitoring discipline.
The outcome is a decrease in the steady-state
inventory level.
Interestingly, the effect of control by a certain type
of blockholder, like banks, should be more evident in
a small firm. This is so because in a large firm there are
1Economies of scale on public issues of financing instruments
hinder their availability to a small firm. Thus, the presence ofbanks is a particular good signal for such firm public issues.alternative control mechanisms like financial markets.
Thus, we expect a different pattern of inventory
investment in a small firm compared with that in a
large one. This feature, jointly with those mentioned
in the description of the liquidity channel, defines our
first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. A small firm with banks and/or other
institutional investors in its ownership structure
accumulates fewer inventories than its counterparts.
This lower equilibrium inventory level is not
observed in a large firm.
In a complex, diversified firm, it is easier to
hide those actions through which large block-
holders seek private benefits by obliging overinvest-
ment in a certain direction. Hence, for this type of
firm, the presence of banks (monitoring specialists)
should have great effects by preventing these
value-decreasing overinvestment policies. This
should be translated into a lower equilibrium
inventory level.
Hypothesis 2. In a diversified firm, the presence of
institutional investors like banks should lead to a
lower equilibrium inventory level.
When considering the number of blockholders, a
bargaining effect that shapes a firm’s investment policy
emerges. This effect accounts for the difficulty in
reaching agreement among those blockholders that
require a firm to follow specific and, in some occasions,
divergent policies in order to enjoy particular private
benefits of control. These policies, when they are
mutually exclusive, act as an implicit protection for the
minority and prevent overinvestment. This demon-
strates a negative relationship between the number of
blockholders and overinvestment inventory policies
linked to minority expropriation.
Hypothesis 3. The number of blockholder has a
negative effect on the equilibrium inventory level.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that
inventories do not only provide liquidity but they
may also serve as collateral in debt contracts (Tribo´,
2001). Moreover, a bank-debt financed firm must
adhere to a rigid payment scheme (debt contracting)
which stimulates investment in liquid assets like
inventories. Apart from that, the aforementioned
control role is expected to be stronger for bloc-
kholder banks in preventing overinvestment initia-
tives than for lender banks without ownership as
these latter do not have real power obliging a firm
PRESS
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Econto follow a particular policy. This is our last
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. A bank-equity financed firm accumu-
lates, on average, fewer inventories than a bank-
debt financed one.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data and preliminary evidence
We carry out our empirical analysis making use of
a sample of annual observations of Spanish manu-
facturing firms for the period 1996–2000. This sample
is extracted from the Sistema de Ana´lisis de Balances
de Empresas Espan˜olas (SABE) database . This
database is compiled from the Spanish company
register by Bureau Van Dijk. It covers companies of
all sizes from all economic sectors. We have focused
on those non-financial firms that have provided
ARTICLE
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Contingency analysis
Smalla
INVENSALES4Meanb INVENSALES4
BANKOWN4Meanb 9.96% 9.52%
BANKOWNpMeanb 10.44% 11.58%
Pearsonc 0.80 0.68
BANKOWN450% 4.04% 0%
BANKOWNp50% 10.48% 11.63%
Pearsonc 0.037** 0.114*
CORPOWN4Meanb 9.87% 10.25%
CORPOWNpMeanb 11.21% 12.76%
Pearsonc 0.019** 0.052**
INDOWN4Meanb 10.23% 11.84%
INDOWNpMeanb 10.6% 11.05%
Pearsonc 0.519 0.556
CGNUM4Meanb 10.06% 11.91%
CGNUMpMeanb 10.50% 11.44%
Pearsonc 0.561 0.768
BANKLEND4Meanb 9.58% 12.05%
BANKLENDpMeanb 10.50% 11.45%
Pearsonc 0.371 0.74
ROA4Meanb 7.06% 10.59%
ROApMeanb 13.10% 12.74%
Pearsonc 0.000*** 0.098***
aSmall firms mean that LEMPLOYo4, large firms have LEMPLOY
more than one sector. We use 4 as threshold as it is the mean value of L
bMean values for the corresponding sector and year.
cPearson test. The null hypothesis is that both percentages of firms ar
***99% significant.nformation on their ownership and which do not
ave inconsistencies in their balance sheets. The final
utcome is an unbalanced panel data of 2,783 firms.
To characterize a firm’s equilibrium inventory
evel, we use the year average inventory-to-sales ratio
INVENSALES). Variations in this ratio are a good
roxy of variations in a firm’s steady-state inventory
evel. Concerning ownership structure, this is reflected
y different variables applied to the 10 largest
hareholders (firm’s blockholders): banks’ stake
BANKOWN), other corporations’ stake (COR-
OWN) and individuals’ stake (INDOWN). We also
haracterize a firm’s control group (CG), which is
efined as the coalition of the largest stakeholders
hat accounts for more than 50% of the stake, with
wo variables: the stake of this coalition (CGOWN)
nd the number of blockholders that it comprises
CGNUM). Finally, we incorporate a measure of a
hareholders’ contestability (CONTESTA), which is
efined as the ratio of the stake not owned by the two
PRESS
omics 108 (2007) 213–220Largea Diversifieda
Meanb INVENSALES4Meanb INVENSALES4Meanb
8.43% 12.90%
5.40% 11.74%
0.23 0.84
3.03% 7.14%
5.52% 11.80%
0.532 0.59
4.48% 11.58%
6.81% 12.07%
0.007*** 0.759
4.8% 10.83%
6.25% 12.49%
0.087* 0.289
7.24% 12.77%
5.19% 11.57%
0.085* 0.568
7.79% 16.48%
4.98% 11.21%
0.01*** 0.04**
4.29% 9.68%
7.56% 13.71%
0.000*** 0.009***
44 and diversified firms are those whose main activities are in
EMPLOY variable. All the variables are defined in the text.
e statistically independent. *90% significant, **95% significant,
4
IN
those of the random-effects estimations. If there are systematic
differences, the only consistent estimator is the fixed-effects one.
If not, the best alternative to use is the random-effects estimation.
4We use 4 as the threshold value of LEMPLOY because it is
the mean value for this variable.
n Eco
5largest stakeholders to the difference in the stake of
the two largest stakeholders. The higher this variable,
the more likely it is for the largest blockholder to lose
control of the firm.
To avoid spurious correlations, we introduce
different controls. First, financing pressure is
characterized by the debt to equity ratio (DE-
QUITY). Second, a firm’s profitability is measured
by the return on assets (ROA) which is the ratio of
profits before interest and taxes to the total assets.
Third, market structure is given by the Herfindahl
index (HERFINDAHL).2 Fourth, size effects are
controlled with a variable (LEMPLOY), which is
the number of employees on a log scale. Last, to
contrast Hypothesis 4, we use BANKLEND, that
is, the ratio of bank debt to total debt.
To provide preliminary evidence of our theore-
tical contentions we conduct different tests of mean
differences that are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 shows the proportion of firms with
INVENSALES larger than the mean for the sector
and compares this proportion in different scenarios.
These are defined by the value of different variables
compared to the mean for the sector. In columns 2,
3 and 4, we focus on small, large and diversified
firms (see the table for definitions).
We find that, on average, a firm with stakeholdings
from banks higher than the mean for the sector does
not show lower INVENSALES. However, this ratio is
lower when stakeholder banks account for more than
50% (bank-controlled firms) and especially so for small
firms. This conforms to Hypothesis 1. Also, lender
banks, contrary to blockholder banks, do not generate
such an effect on inventories. This is consistent with
Hypothesis 4. Concerning other investors, corporations
have a negative effect on inventory accumulation, but
individual investors do not.
Finally, control variables show that the more
profitable firms adjust better their production in
relation to their sales (lower INVENSALES).
3.2. Methods and results
To extend the previous analysis, we rely on
regression techniques and we take advantage of
the panel data structure of our sample. Our basic
specification is as follows:
INVENSALESit ¼ aþ b1 BANKOWNit
þ b2 CORPOWNit þ b3 INDOWNit
ARTICLE
2This is the square root of the sum for all the firms in a sector
of their sales market share to the square.
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Productioþ b4 CGNUMit
þ b5 CGOWNit þ b6 CONTESTAit
þ b7 LEMPLOYit þ b8 ROA
þ b9 DEQUITYit
þ b10 HERFINDAHLit þ ui þ ct þ it,
ð1Þ
where ui accounts for the unobservable heterogene-
ity, ct is a temporal error term and eit is a white-
noise error term.
We recognize the possibility that ui may be
correlated with a firm’s ownership structure (fixed
effects). To investigate whether this is the case, we
conduct Hausman tests in each specification.3
Additionally, for those specifications where fixed
effects are not shown, we have conducted a second
Hausman test. This compares random-effects esti-
mations (consistent but less efficient) with cross-
section regressions (efficient but may not be
consistent). This second test shows that there are
no systematic differences between the coefficients of
both estimations. Thus, we stick to the simple
regression estimation in these cases (columns 1 and
2 of Table 2).
Table 2 presents four regressions. In column 1
there is the cross-section regression for the whole
sample, whereas in columns 2 and 3 we restrict the
sample to small (LEMPLOYo4) and large firms
(LEMPLOY44).4 Finally, column 4 shows the
results for diversified firms (those whose main
activities are in more than one sector). Hausman
test reveals that estimations in columns 3 and 4
should be made using fixed-effects techniques, while
those of columns 1 and 2 are simple regressions.
Also, we address a multicollinearity problem
between CORPOWN and INDOWN variables. To
do so, we use the residual term of an estimation of
INDOWN following specification (1) as a substitute
of this variable (orthogonalization). Finally, tests of
fitness reveal that all models are significant.
We find that there is a clear negative relationship
between the presence of institutional investor
(banks or corporations) and its INVENSALES.
Moreover, this is particularly true for small firms
PRESS
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Table 2
Regressions on INVENSALES
All (robust regression)a,b Small (robust regression)a,b Large (fixed effect)a Diversified (fixed effect)a
BANKOWN 0.015*** (4.57) 0.035*** (5.76) 0.010 (0.58) 0.121*** (2.54)
CORPOWN 0.010** (3.77) 0.020** (3.58) 0.000 (0.11) 0.041*** (4.02)
INDOWN 0.060* (1.44) 0.007* (0.72) 0.019*** (4.47) 0.028** (1.79)
CGNUM 0.091* (1.61) 0.165* (1.65) 0.045 (0.65) 0.974***(3.2)
CGOWN 0.005* (0.75) 0.018 (1.43) 0.026*** (3.01) 0.019 (0.44)
CONTESTA 0.186 (0.23) 2.11* (1.62) 0.634 (0.78) 5.409** (1.83)
LEMPLOY 0.893*** (8.16) 1.550*** (4.02) 0.122 (0.38) 0.205 (0.26)
ROA 3.874*** (4.00) 6.615*** (3.10) 0.037 (0.04) 0.625 (0.19)
DEQUITY 100c 0.023 (1.08) 0.060 (0.47) 0.000 (0.02) 0.782 (0.36)
HERFINDAHL 0.007** (1.99) 0.900 (1.10) 0.028 (1.36) 0.087** (2.43)
Constant 6.826*** (4.57) 9.700*** (5.46) 0.323 (0.13) 0.988 (0.16)
Number of observations 5248 2419 2829 904
Hausman test 24.71 (0.133) 21.78 (0.151) 44.08 (0.000) 31.05 (0.055)
Hausman testd 17.72 (0.606) 21.18 (0.387)
Log (likelihood) 18616.031 9152.952 4806.636 1939.298
Fitness of the model (F test) 7.15 (0.000) 5.92 (0.000) 4.49 (0.000) 4.01 (0.000)
aT statistics in parentheses. Include sector and temporal dummy variables.
bRobust estimations to correct for heteroskedasticity. *90% significant, **95% significant, ***99% significant. All the variables are
defined in the text.
cThe coefficients are multiplied by 100.
dSee the text, for an explanation of implementing two Hausman Tests in columns 1 and 2.
Table 3
Definition of dependent variable V
Variable V DINV ¼ 1a DBANK ¼ 1a DBLOAN ¼ 1a
V ¼ 7 1 1 1
V ¼ 6 1 1 0
V ¼ 5 1 0 1
V ¼ 4 1 0 0
V ¼ 3 0 1 1
V ¼ 2 0 1 0
V ¼ 1 0 0 1
V ¼ 0 0 0 0
aDINV ¼ 1 (0) if INVENSALES4(p)Mean; DBANK ¼ 1
(0) if BANKOWN4( ¼ )Mean; DBLOAN ¼ 1 (0) if BANK-
LEND4(p)Mean, where Mean is the mean value for the
corresponding sector and year. All the variables are defined in the
text.
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Production Economics 108 (2007) 213–220218and/or diversified ones, but not for large firms. This
conforms to Hypotheses 1 and 2. Also, increases in
stakeholdings, when stakeholders are banks, show
larger negative effects on the average inventory level
than when they are corporations. This is a reflection
of the fact that banks are especially able to provide
liquidity and/or prevent overinvestment policies
(control role). Additionally, we have founded that
the presence of individual investors does not
stimulate inventory disinvestment.
Once we focus on other dimensions of a firm’s
ownership structure, we do observe a negative relation-
ship between the number of blockholders in the CG
and a firm’s inventory level. This is especially clear for
diversified firms where minority expropriating possibi-
lities are higher. This fully conforms to Hypothesis 3.
Concerning control variables, financial structure
does not explain inventory investment once owner-
ship structure has been taken into account. Finally,
a low level of inventory to sales is shown in highly
profitable firms and/or large ones and/or with high
market power.
3.2.1. Bank-equity financing versus bank-debt financing
To investigate Hypothesis 4, we conduct a multi-
nomial logit estimation on a variable V that
encompasses all the events resulting from theith significant changes in a firm’s bank financing
equity or debt). This allows us to isolate the effects
f changes in banks’ stakes with those in banks’
oans given the potential strong connection between
oth variables. We consider as independent
ariables those of specification (1) but without
ncluding BANKOWN, as it is integrated in
ependent variable V. This latter variable is defined
n Table 3.
6
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Table 4
Multinomial logit analysis
Prob (DINV ¼ 1)a condit. to (%) T test of meansb
DBANK ¼ 1&DBLOAN ¼ 0a 1.220 46.054 (0.000)
DBANK ¼ 0&DBLOAN ¼ 0a 8.088
DBANK ¼ 0&DBLOAN ¼ 1a 7.522 5.133 (0.000)
DBANK ¼ 0&DBLOAN ¼ 0a 8.088
DBANK ¼ 1&DBLOAN ¼ 0a 1.220 37.595 (0.000)
DBANK ¼ 0&DBLOAN ¼ 1a 7.522
aDINV ¼ 1 (0) if INVENSALES4(p)Mean; DBANK ¼ 1 (0) if BANKOWN4( ¼ )Mean; DBLOAN ¼ 1 (0) if BANK-
LEND4(p)Mean, where Mean is the mean value for the corresponding sector and year. All the variables are defined in the text.
bT statistics in parentheses.
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Production Economics 108 (2007) 213–220 219From the multinational logit specification, we can
compute the probability of different results for V
(we denote Pi ¼ Prob(V ¼ i)). From Pi we can
obtain conditional probabilities of major changes in
INVENSALES (DINV ¼ 1) contingent on signifi-
cant changes in banks’ stake (DBANK ¼ 1), in one
case, and in banks’ loans (DBLOAN ¼ 1), in the
other. In particular, Prob(DINV ¼ 1/DBANK ¼
1&DBLOAN ¼ 0) ¼ P6/(P2+P6), Prob(DINV ¼
1/DBANK ¼ 0&DBLOAN ¼ 1) ¼ P5/(P1+P5) and
so on, for other marginal probabilities. Also, in
order to better separate the effects due to changes in
bank equity from those due to changes in bank
debt, we have focused on those firms where their
debtholder banks are not shareholders.
Table 4 shows that a firm with a banks’ stake
higher than the mean for the sector is less likely to
increase its inventory ratio above the mean value for
the sector than a firm without such a stake. The
same can be said when focusing on bank loans. But,
interestingly, when we compare bank-equity finan-
cing with bank-debt financing, we do observe
that the effect of the former is larger than the
latter (lower probability of a high INVENSALES
when banks’ stakes are large than what banks’
loans are: 1.220 versus 7.522). This conforms to
Hypothesis 4.
4. Conclusions
This paper shows the relevance of a firm’s
ownership structure on its definition of inventory
policy. We find that a firm with institutional
investors (banks and other corporations) as bloc-
kholders shows lower average inventory levels when
compared with its counterparts who do not have
such investors. We explain this result in terms of the
provision of liquidity as well as the tight controlexercised by these types of blockholders, especially
in small firms and/or diversified ones. Also, by
comparing bank-equity financing with bank-debt
financing, we argue that the control possibilities
available to a bank as a shareholder are superior to
those as a lender. This justifies the reduced
probability of a firm overinvesting in inventories
in the former case, in comparison with the latter.
Finally, we identify the number of blockholders as a
dimension of a firm’s ownership structure that
affects its inventory level. This is so because the
higher this number, the greater the difficulty in
reaching agreements among different blockholders
and the manager so as to pursue overinvestment
policies to seek private benefits. This reduction in
overinvestment is translated into a lower inventory
level. We prove these contentions making use of a
database of Spanish manufacturing firms for the
period 1996–2000. Although these years correspond
to expansive years, we expect that in recessive
periods the result of a reduction in the average
inventory level related to banks ownership should
be even stronger. This is so because monitoring and
control by banks so as to prevent overinvestment is
particularly important in recessive periods.
Finally, we mention two ways of extending the
paper. First, it may be interesting to focus the study
on sectors divided by growth rate. We expect to
obtain a more visible effect of a firm’s ownership
structure on inventories in growth sectors than in
non-growth sectors. Second, it may be enlightening
to investigate whether changes in ownership struc-
ture, once a firm has been floated on the stock
market, could have an impact on its inventory
investment. This may well affect the overall
economic cycle as more firms are floated on the
stock market. This will be the subject of future
research.
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